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Article	50	is	flawed:	could	the	ECJ	extend	the	two-
year	withdrawal	period?
The	two-year	time	limit	stipulated	in	Article	50,	argues	Philip	Allott	(University	of	Cambridge),	is
wildly	unrealistic:	its	drafters	never	anticipated	that	a	large	member	state	would	ever	leave	the	EU.
In	this	legal	opinion,	he	sets	out	how	the	ECJ	could	extend	the	withdrawal	period,	thereby	allowing
the	UK	to	leave	in	an	orderly	fashion.
The	UK’s	scheduled	withdrawal	from	the	EU	next	March	–	quite	possibly	without	a	deal	–	has	led
to	general	legal	confusion.	It	may	be	useful	to	identify	legal	aspects	of	the	situation	which	are,	in
my	opinion,	beyond	reasonable	doubt.	The	underlying	legal	situation	might	now	be	irremediably	corrupted,	but	it	may
still	be	worth	setting	out	a	legal	opinion	that	could	have	been	given	at	any	time	during	the	Article	50	process	and
which,	in	my	view,	still	applies.	One	purpose	of	a	framework	legal	opinion	of	this	kind	is	to	allow	other	people	to
express	their	own	opinion	on	the	same	matters	as	precisely	as	possible.
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1.	The	UK	notification	of	intention	to	withdraw	from	the	EU	may	be	withdrawn	at	any	time.	It	is	a	notification	of
intention	to	withdraw.	It	is	not	a	notification	of	withdrawal,	notwithstanding	the	erroneous	title	of	the	European	Union
(Notification	of	Withdrawal)	Act	2017.	(Section	1(1)	of	the	Act	is	correct.)	If	the	intention	changes,	the	European
Council	could	be	so	informed	and	the	negotiation	of	a	withdrawal	agreement	could	cease.	Many	treaties	contain	a
provision	allowing	for	‘notification	of	withdrawal’	by	a	contracting	party	(not	including	the	word	‘intention’).
2.	The	period	of	negotiation	of	a	withdrawal	agreement	can	be	extended	beyond	29	March	2019.	Article	50,
paragraph	3,	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	provides	as	follows.	“The	Treaties	shall	cease	to	apply	to	the	State	in
question	from	the	date	of	entry	into	force	of	the	withdrawal	agreement	or,	failing	that,	two	years	after	the	notification
referred	to	in	paragraph	2,	unless	the	European	Council,	in	agreement	with	the	Member	State	concerned,
unanimously	decides	to	extend	this	period.”
(a)	Given	the	catastrophic	consequences,	in	the	UK	and	the	EU	and	across	the	world,	of	a	UK	withdrawal	without	an
agreement,	it	would	surely	be	a	grave	breach	of	public	responsibility	on	both	sides	to	fail	to	extend	the	period	of
negotiation	–	a	failure	that	could	constitute	a	breach	of	UK	public	law	and/or	of	EU	law.
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(b)	The	negotiation	of	international	agreements	on	a	large	scale	always	takes	many	more	than	two	years.	A
withdrawal	agreement	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	would	affect	every	aspect	of	two	vastly	complex	constitutional
and	substantive	law	systems,	from	the	broadest	to	the	most	detailed	levels,	and	the	constitutional	and	substantive
law	systems	of	27	other	states,	not	to	mention	its	worldwide	effects.
(c)	It	could	not	possibly	be	expected	to	enter	into	force	two	years	after	the	start	of	its	negotiation,	given	that,	to	enter
into	force,	it	must	be	concluded	by	the	European	Council,	with	the	consent	of	the	European	Parliament,	subject	to
ratification	by	28	states	–	processes	that	could	typically	take	many	years.
(d)	Such	a	wildly	unrealistic	two-year	time-limit	suggests	that	the	drafters	of	Article	50	had	in	mind	that	there	was	no
realistic	prospect	that	it	would	ever	apply	to	one	of	the	largest	member	states.	One	of	the	principal	drafters	has
confirmed	this.
(e)	Article	50(3)	could	have	been	drafted	to	refer	to	‘the	conclusion	of	the	withdrawal	agreement’	as	the	fact	that
cancels	the	two-year	time-limit.	It	was	not	so	drafted.	It	refers	to	‘the	entry	into	force	of	the	withdrawal	agreement’.	A
withdrawal	agreement	with	the	UK	could	not	have	been	expected	to	enter	into	force	within	two	years	from	the	date	of
the	UK’s	notification	of	intention	to	withdraw	(see	para.	2(b)	and	(c)	above).
(f)	It	follows	that	the	European	Court	of	Justice	of	the	EU	could	well	decide	that	the	correct	interpretation	of	Article	50
of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	is	that	the	article	cannot	be	applied	as	it	stands	in	the	case	of	the	notification	of	an
intention	to	withdraw	by	one	of	the	largest	member	states.	This	matter	could	be	before	the	European	Court	directly	or
by	way	of	a	request	from	a	national	court	for	a	preliminary	ruling.
(g)	A	‘general	rule’	for	the	interpretation	of	treaties	is	set	out	in	Article	31	of	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of
Treaties	(1969).	“(1)	A	treaty	shall	be	interpreted	in	good	faith	in	accordance	with	the	ordinary	meaning	to	be	given	to
the	terms	of	the	treaty	in	their	context	and	in	the	light	of	its	object	and	purpose...”
(h)	Article	32	sets	out	‘supplementary	means	of	interpretation’.	“Recourse	may	be	had	to	supplementary	means	of
interpretation,	including	the	preparatory	work	of	the	treaty	and	the	circumstances	of	its	conclusion,	in	order	to	confirm
the	meaning	resulting	from	the	application	of	article	31,	or	to	determine	the	meaning	when	the	interpretation
according	to	article	31:	(a)	leaves	the	meaning	ambiguous	or	obscure;	or	(b)	leads	to	a	result	which	is	manifestly
absurd	or	unreasonable.”
3.	Extending	the	period	of	negotiation	would	allow	a	perfectly	orderly	UK	withdrawal	from	the	EU.
(a)	In	the	light	of	the	precedent	of	UK	accession	to	the	European	Communities,	there	could	be	an	interim	period
between	the	conclusion	of	a	withdrawal	agreement	and	its	entry	into	force.	During	that	time,	the	UK	would	remain	a
member	state	and	would	be	subject	to	EU	law	and	would	be	entitled	and	obliged	to	participate	in	the	work	of	the	EU
and	the	decision-making	of	its	institutions.
(b)	A	withdrawal	agreement	could	not	change	that	situation,	since	any	such	change	would	require	amendments	to
the	EU	Treaties,	amendments	which	would	only	take	effect	on	the	entry	into	force	of	the	withdrawal	agreement.
(c)	In	the	light	of	the	same	precedent,	there	could	be	a	transitional	period	after	the	entry	into	force	of	a	withdrawal
agreement	when	the	UK,	no	longer	a	member	state,	and	the	EU	institutions	are	dealing	with	consequences	of	the
new	situation.	The	UK	would	not	participate	in	the	decision-making	of	the	EU	institutions	during	that	period,	except	to
the	extent	that	the	withdrawal	agreement	provided	otherwise.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Philip	Allott	is	Professor	Emeritus	of	International	Public	Law	at	Cambridge	University	and	a	Fellow	of	Trinity	College
Cambridge.	As	a	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	legal	adviser,	he	participated	in	the	UK’s	accession	negotiations
to	the	European	Communities	and	was	the	first	Legal	Counsellor	in	the	UK	Permanent	Representation	to	the
European	Communities	in	Brussels.
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